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RECENT CASES
like the Kiwanis and Sertoma Club probably would not qualify for the
exemption, while clubs such as the Moose, Masons and Shriners would
qualify. The former organizations do not have rigorous admissions re-
quirements and procedures as do the latter. The former are service and
professional organizations which accept anyone who shares their common
interest, while the latter are highly private clubs which are selective as to
admission. Should the private club and establishment exemption not apply
to § 1981, then it is questionable whether the constitutional right of privacy
would protect them. The right of privacy has been limited to highly
personal situations, and it may not constitute a limitation on § 1981 except
in such situations.
The decision in Runyon indicates that the extension of the 1866 Civil
Rights Act to private discrimination, as begun in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., will be continued. However, the application of § 1981 to private
discrimination is not without limits. It is possible that the private club and
establishment exemption contained in the 1964 Civil Rights Act will bar the
application of § 1981 to private clubs. Even without the statutory exemp-
tion, the countervailing constitutional interests of privacy and freedom of
association remain. The courts will be faced with the task of balancing the
state's interest in prohibiting discrimination against these constitutional
rights. In highly personal areas the constitutional interests will prevail. In
more public areas, the scales may tip in favor of § 1981. However, it will
remain for future courts to determine the precise line to be drawn.
RUSSELL L. WEAVER




Leroy James was charged with molesting a minor. 2 The prosecution
then sought to commit him to a state mental hospital pursuant to Missouri's
Criminal Sexual Psychopath Act.3 A jury found James to be a criminal
sexual psychopath.4 After this finding the trial judge exercised his statu-
1. 534 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1976).
2. Brief for Respondent at 3.
3. §§ 202.700-.770, RSMo 1969. The accused must be charged with a crimi-
nal offense before he can be committed under the statute. § 202.710, RSMo 1969.
However, it need not be a sexual offense. State ex rel. Sweezer v. Green, 360 Mo.
1249, 1255, 232 S.W.2d 897, 901 (En Banc 1950).
4. Section 202.700, RSMo 1969, provides:
All persons suffering from a mental disorder and not insane or feeble-
1977]
1
Rhodes: Rhodes: Constitutional Law-Equal Protection and Due Process
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1977
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
tory discretion, 5 electing to commit James rather than ordering him to be
tried on the original criminal charge. Five years later James petitioned for
release under section 202.740, RSMo 1969.6 After a hearing the petition
was denied, and James appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court, contend-
ing that the sexual psychopath statute deprived him of equal protection of
the law. The supreme court affirmed, holding that the statute did not
violate equal protection. 7
Sexual psychopath statutes were passed by many states in the 1930's
and 1940's in response to a highly publicized apparent increase in sex
crimes and the generally recognized ineffectiveness of criminal punish-
ment as a deterrent.8 By committing dangerous sex offenders, legislatures
hoped to achieve both the protection of the community and the rehabilita-
tion of the offenders. Early cases upheld the constitutionality of such
statutes from a variety of attacks, often by simply labeling the commitment
procedure as "civil" and thereby holding inapplicable the protections af-
forded the criminally accused. 9
The state's power to commit dangerous sex offenders is grounded in
two separate legal bases: parens patriae and preservation of public order
and safety. Under the former, sex offenders are confined for the purpose
of receiving care and treatment; under the latter they are confined for the
purpose of protecting the community. Missouri's sexual psychopath statute
reflects both of these purposes.'0
minded, which mental disorder has existed for a period of not less than
one year immediately prior to the filing of the petition provided for in
section 202.710 coupled with criminal propensities to the commission of
sex offenses, and who may be considered dangerous to others, are hereby
declared.to be "criminal sexual psychopaths".
5. Section 202.730, RSMo 1969, provides in part:
If the person is found by the court or the jury to be a criminal sexual
psychopath, the court may commit him to State Hospital No. I at Fulton
where he shall be detained and treated until released . . . or may order
such person to be tried upon the criminal charges against him, as the
interests of substantial justice may require.
6. Section 202.740, RSMo 1969, provides that the criminal sexual
psychopath may file a petition showing that he "has improved to the extent that his
release will not be incompatible with the welfare of society," whereupon a hearing
like the original commitment hearing is held. The court then either releases the
defendant on probationary status or returns him to the state hospital.
7. 534 S.W.2d at 43.
8. Annot., 34 A.L.R.3d 652 (1970), 24 A.L.R.2d 350 (1952).
9. E.g., State ex rel. Sweezer v. Green, 360 Mo. 1249, 232 S.W.2d 897 (En
Banc 1950) (no violation of ex post facto, self-incrimination, or due process); Ex
parte Keddy, 105 Cal. App. 2d 215, 233 P.2d 159 (1951) (no violation of equal
protection, due process, or double jeopardy); People v. Chapman, 301 Mich. 584,4
N.W.2d 18 (1942) (no violation of equal protection, due process, ex post facto,
self-incrimination, or cruel and unusual punishment). Language in Sweezer that the
self-incrimination privilege applies only in criminal cases has been overruled. State
ex rel. North v. Kirtley, 327 S.W.2d 166, 168 (Mo. En Banc 1959). But cf. State v.
Crabtree, 458 S.W.2d 292, 296 (Mo. 1970).
10. State v. McDaniels, 307 S.W.2d 42, 44 (K.C. Mo. App. 1957).
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If sex offenders are committed for the purpose of receiving treatment,
they arguably have the right to be treated. Missouri's statute, in fact,
contains language that can be fairly construed to guarantee this right." Yet
the hard fact remains that for many sex offenders, no known treatment is
available.1 2 While treatable offenders, assuming they are in fact treated,
have at least some chance of being rehabilitated and released, the nontreat-
able offenders are by definition sentenced to lifetime commitment. As one
court has observed, ". . . [the] promise of treatment has served only to
bring an illusion of benevolence to what is essentially a warehousing opera-
tion for social misfits.'
' 3
Missouri's sexual psychopath statute, however, does not require a
finding of treatability as a condition precedent to commitment. This may
raise constitutional problems, for the United States Supreme Court has
held, in the context of criminal defendants committed as mentally incom-
petent to stand trial, that due process requires that the nature and duration
of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the
individual is committed.' 4 Insofar as the purpose of commitment of sexual
psychopaths is treatment, and treatment is not provided, the nature of the
commitment bears no reasonable relation to its purpose.' 5 Thus, if non-
treatable sex offenders are to be constitutionally committed, it must be
solely on the basis of dangerousness. 16 Whether persons committed on
grounds of dangerousness nevertheless enjoy the right to treatment is a
question that remains unresolved.' 7
But, even assuming that it is consistent with due process to commit
dangerous, nontreatable sex offenders, Missouri's statute remains suspect
inasmuch as it requires only a finding that the accused "may be considered
dangerous to others."'8 Psychiatrists' predictions of dangerousness are
notoriously unreliable,' 9 and it is not uncommon for nonviolent sex of-
11. Section 202.730, RSMo 1969 provides that sexual psychopaths "shall be
detained and treated until released" and that the hospital shall periodically examine
those committed in order to determine "the progress of treatment" (emphasis
added).
12. See Burick, An Analysis of the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act, 59 J.
CRIm. L.C. & P.S. 254, 256 (1968); Tappan, Some Myths About the Sex Offenders, 19
FED. PROB. 7, 11 (June 1955).
13. Cross v. Harris, 418 F.2d 1095, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
14. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
15. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507,521 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated on other
grounds, 95 S. Ct. 2486 (1975).
16. Davy v. Sullivan, 354 F. Supp. 1320, 1329 (M.D. Ala. 1973).
17. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 95 S. Ct. 2486, 2491 n.6 (1975). The court of
appeals had ruled that regardless of the basis for commitment, it must be justified
by a quid pro quo in the form of treatment. 493 F.2d at 522. Chief Justice Burger,
however, disapproved of the quid pro quo theory in his concurring opinion. 95 S. Ct.
at 2497.
18. See statute quoted note 4 supra (emphasis added).
19. See Laves, The Prediction of "Dangerousness" as a Criterion for Involuntary
Civil Commitment: Constitutional Considerations, 3 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 291, 295
(1975); Tappan, supra note 11, at 9-10.
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fenders, such as exhibitionists and "peepers," to be committed as sexual
psychopaths. 20 Surely, then, due process requires a more certain prediction
of dangerousness than is provided for in the Missouri statute. 21
Further, if the state is permitted to confine dangerous people, may it
commit dangerous sex offenders while allowing other dangerous people to
remain free? Equal protection requires, at the very least, a rational basis for
statutory classifications that- treat similarly situated people differently.22
The sexual psychopath classification is clearly underinclusive in terms of
dangerousness, and there seems to be no readily apparent rational basis for
treating dangerous sex offenders differently than other dangerous people.
Despite these difficulties the United States Supreme Court in 1940 held
that the sexual psychopath classification did not violate equal protection,
reasoning that ". . . the legislature is free to recognize degrees of harm,
and it may confine its restrictions to those classes of cases where the need is
deemed to be clearest." 23
A closely related equal protection issue arises in the procedural con-
text. Recent Supreme Court decisions have indicated that there is no
rational basis for depriving one class of involuntarily committed persons of
the same procedural protections that are granted to another class of in-
voluntarily committed persons. More specifically, equal protection requires
that the procedural protections guaranteed to those committed under
general civil commitment statutes also be provided in commitments of
prisoners nearing the end of their sentences, 24 criminal defendants mental-
ly incompetent to stand trial,25 and sexual psychopaths.26 In Missouri,
involuntary civil commitment procedures27 are substantially similar to sex-
20. One study indicates that over fifty percent of those committed as "sexually
dangerous persons" in Illinois are in fact nonviolent. Burick, supra note 11, at 255
n.15.
21. In the civil commitment context, see Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378,
390 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (state must prove a real and and present threat of substantial
harm); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1093 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on
other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974) (state must prove an extreme likelihood of
immediate harm).
22. McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270 (1973). In other words, any
distinctions drawn must have some relevance to the purpose for which the classifi-
cation is made. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111 (1966). Arguably, however,
the stricter "compelling state interest" standard should apply to sexual psychopath
classifications. See Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237
(1974).
23. Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270, 275 (1940).
24. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 110-15 (1966).
25. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 723-31 (1972).
26. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972) (remanded for hearing on
whether any justification for depriving sexual psychopaths of jury trial while
granting it to those civilly committed); People v. Feagley, 14 Cal. 3d 338, 352-58,
535 P.2d 373, 381-86, 121 Cal. Rptr. 509, 517-22 (1975); In re Andrews, 334
N.E.2d 15, 22-23 (Mass. 1975); State ex rel. Farrell v. Stovall, 59 Wis. 2d 148,
169-73, 207 N.W.2d 809, 819-21 (1973).
27. § 202.807, RSMo 1969.
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ual psychopath commitment procedures.2" Assuming the civil commitment
procedures do not violate due process,2 9 the sexual psychopath commit-
ment procedures appear to meet equal protection requirements. However,
release procedures differ in that those civilly committed may be released
whenever the hospital head deems fit,3" whereas sexual psychopaths appar-
ently can be released only by court order.3 1 This difference may be justified
by the fact that sexual psychopaths are considered dangerous. However,
those committed as criminally insane are considered no less dangerous,
and courts have split on whether there is a rational basis for requiring court
participation in the release of the criminally insane.3 2 By analogy, then, it is
unclear whether the release procedures in Missouri's sexual psychopath
statute are valid.
In addition to meeting equal protection requirements, procedural
protections for accused sexual psychopaths must comply with due process
standards. The United States Supreme Court discussed the extent of these
due process rights in Specht v. Patterson,3 3 but it did not then consider the
question of the burden of proof necessary to commit a sexual psychopath.
The Court later held in In re Winship%4 that in juvenile delinquency pro-
ceedings due process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the
offense which would constitute a crime if committed by an adult.35 The
Winship rationale is applicable in sexual psychopath proceedings, where
the accused, like his juvenile counterpart, is faced with indefinite loss of
liberty and serious social stigmatization. Accordingly, several courts have
recently held that the reasonable doubt standard must be met in sexual
psychopath proceedings.36 Proof beyond a reasonable doubt has also been
28. § 202.720, RSMo 1969.
29. Missouri's civil commitment procedure may well violate due process. See
Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F.
Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974).
30. § 202.827, RSMo 1969.
31. See statute quoted note 6 supra. However, § 202.770, RSMo 1969, pro-
vides that "[a]ll laws now in force relating to the admission of insane persons to state
hospitals, shall apply to criminal sexual psychopaths" (emphasis added). It is un-
clear whether this section makes the release provision in § 202.827, RSMo 1969,
applicable to sexual psychopaths.
32. Compare State v. Clemons, 110 Ariz. 79, 515 P.2d 324 (1973) (equal
protection violated) with Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (equal
protection not violated). See also State v. Kee, 510 S.W.2d 477 (Mo. En Banc 1974),
criticized in Stoll, Criminal Procedure-Automatic Commitment of Defendants Found Not
Guilty By Reason of Insanity, 41 MO. L. REv. 439 (1976).
33. 386 U.S. 605, 610 (1967) (due process requires right to counsel, right to be
present at a hearing, right to offer evidence, right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses, and right to a meaningful record for review). Missouri's statute appar-
ently meets these requirements. § 202.720, RSMo 1969.
34. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
35. Id. at 368.
36. United States ex rel. Stachulak v. Coughlin, 520 F.2d 931,935-37 (7th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 947 (1976) (White & Powell, JJ., dissenting); People v.
Pembrock, 62 Ill.2d 317, 321, 342 N.E.2d 28, 29 (1976); People v. Burnick, 14
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required in civil commitments,37 although one federal court has rejected
the standard as "virtually unattainable at this state in the development of
psychiatric medicine. 38
A requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt would also have
the salutory effect of eliminating the prosecutor's incentive to seek commit-
ment of sex offenders when lacking sufficient evidence to convict on the
original criminal charge.3 9 In addition, it would presumably reduce the
number of nondangerous sex offenders erroneously found to be danger-
ous and committed as sexual psychopaths. Moreover, the fact that the
standard may be "virtually unattainable" is certainly no reason to lower the
standard. Rather, where liberty is at stake, the accused must be given the
benefit of doubts stemming from the inadequacies of psychiatric testimony.
In State v. James the Missouri Supreme Court ignored these constitu-
tional problems and considered only the narrow equal protection issue
raised on appeal. Appellant's sole argument was that the statute denied
equal protection by vesting discretion in the trial judge whether to commit
or try the sexual psychopath, inasmuch as there was no rational basis for
treating some sexual psychopaths differently than others. In rejecting this
argument, the court relied on Marshall v. United States.40 In Marshall the
United States Supreme Court found a rational basis for the automatic
exclusion of drug addicts with two or more felony convictions from a
rehabilitative commitment program offered in lieu of penal incarceration.
In upholding this automatic exclusion provision, the Court observed that
while Congress could have left exclusion to the discretion of the trial judge,
equal protection did not require it to do so. The Missouri Supreme Court
quoted this language and concluded without explanation that it was appro-
priate to vest discretion in the trial judge to determine how to detain sexual
psychopaths.
In Marshall, however, the issue was not whether there was a rational
basis for vesting discretion in the trial judge. It was, in fact, the absence of
discretion that was challenged as denying equal protection. Hence, the
Court's comment that it would have been permissible to vest discretion in
Cal.3d 306, 310-25, 535 P.2d 352, 354-64, 121 Cal. Rptr. 488,490-500 (1975); In re
Andrews, 334 N.E.2d 15, 26-27 (Mass. 1975). There are no Missouri cases on the
burden of proof in sexual psychopath proceedings.
37. In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F.
Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974).
38. Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 393, n.12 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (requiring
clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence). See also Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.
2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1971) (upholding a preponderance standard in "defective delin-
quent" commitments),, cert. dismissed as improvidently granted sub nom., Murel v.
Baltimore City Criminal Court, 407 U.S. 355 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting, requir-
ing reasonable doubt standard).
39. People v. Pembrock, 23 Ill. App. 2d 991, 994-95, 320 N.E.2d 470, 473
(1974), aff'd, 62 Ill. 2d 317, 342 N.E.2d 28 (1976).
40. 414 U.S. 417 (1974).
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